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Abstract
This paper is predominantly a nontechnical discus-
sion of some significant aspects of the initial flight
qualification and operational maintenance of the flight
control system software for the X-29A technology
demonstrator. Flight qualification and maintenance
of complex, embedded flight control system soft-
ware poses unique problems. The X-29A technology
demonstrator aircraft has a digital flight control system
which incorporates functions generally considered too
complex for analog systems. Organizational responsi-
bilities, software assurance issues, tools, and facilities
are discussed.
Nomenclature
ACC
AHRS
AR
B/U
CCR
CL
CLP
CM
DARPA
DCL
DR
FCC
FSIM
FS/CP
automatic camber control
attitude heading reference system
analog reversion
backup
configuration change requests
control law
control law processor
configuration management
Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency
DEC control language
digital reversion
flight control computer
function simulation
failure status/control panel
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IBIT
I/O
lOP
ISA
LVDT
MCC
OFP
PA
PAC
PCN
PDL
PLA
PL/I
Pri
Ps/Qc
RAV
SEU
SIBLINC
STR
UA
UDF
Vand V
XAIDS
initiated built-in test
input/output
input/output processor
integrated servoaetuator
linear variable differential
transformer
manual camber control
operational flight program
power approach
precision approach control
program change notice
program design language
throttle position (power lever angle)
programming language I
primary
static pressurefunpact pressure
remotely augmented vehicle
system evaluation unit
scale invert bias logic interface
console
system test report
up and away
unit development folder
verification and validation
extended aircraft interrogation and
display system
Introduction
The first X-29A airplane (Fig. 1) has successfully
completed 242 flights, proving the concept of forward-
swept wings and several other advanced aerodynamic,
structural, and avionic technologies. The X-29A
forward-swept wing technology demonstrator is an
aerodynamically unstable aircraft requiting a highly
augmented software-intensive control system to main-
tain stable flight. In addition to its aerodynamic insta-
bility, theX-29Aairplaneincorporatesthefollowing
technologies:
1. Forward-swept wing planform
2. Tailored composite wing structure
3. Variable incidence close-coupled canard
4. Multisurface control
5. Discrete variable camber
This paper will describe the initial flight quali-
fication and operational maintenance phases of the
X-29A program. The initial flight qualification phase
ended with the qualification of the software system
for first flight. The operational maintenance phase oc-
curred during the flight test program. During this phase
several groups of changes were incorporated and the
software system was requalified for flight after each
change. The flight control system, of which the soft-
ware is a part, is discussed to provide insight into the
complexity of the flight qualification tasks described.
The multiple flight control modes, flight control sys-
tem components, and digital flight control computer
architecture are also discussed.
The first flight of the X-29A airplane occurred on
December 14, 1984. Initial flight qualification in-
cluded the activities which assured that the software
to be used on first flight, integrated with aircraft sys-
tems, was safe (flight-qualified) and that initial mis-
sion requirements could be accomplished. Organiza-
tional responsibilities, the software development pro-
cess, and software assurance functions (change con-
trol, discrepancy reporting and correction, and testing)
during preparation for first flight are discussed.
Operational maintenance included the process by
which software system changes were incorporated and
the software requalified for flight during the opera-
tional phase of the program. This phase started af-
ter flight number four, when the U.S. Government
took possession of the aircraft and assumed responsi-
bility for flight safety. Operational maintenance top-
ics included changes in organizational responsibility,
software development, configuration management and
other software assurance topics, time-saving parallel
development and test activities, and the importance of
a high-fidelity simulation at the user's facility.
Some observations and recommendations are in-
cluded, based on X-29A experience in development
and maintenance of a complex software-intensive sys-
tem. Management and technical issues during ini-
tial flight qualification and operational maintenance
phases of the program are discussed.
Generic terms are used to describe the organiza-
tions involved in the X-29A program. The airframe
manufacturer was Grumman Aerospace Corp., Beth-
page, New York. The term "prime contractor" refers
to Grumman. Grumman subcontracted to Honeywell,
Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the sensor computer
subsystem which included the flight control comput-
ers (FCCs), flight software, and control system sen-
sors. The terms "subcontractor" and "developer" refer
to Honeywell. The U.S. Government is the "customer"
and "user. .... User" refers specifically to the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
Ames Research Center, Dryden Flight Research Facil-
ity, Edwards, California, where the flight test program
was conducted.
System Description
Flight Control System Modes
The control system modes and their options are sum-
marized in Table I. Several of the modes incorpo-
rated variable gains based on airspeed, altitude, Mach
number, and angle of attack to optimize the aircraft's
capabilities throughout the flight envelope. Normal
mode, with its subsets, was implemented in the digital
computers. Degraded modes were included to allow
the system to remain in normal mode with degraded
performance after certain failures. The name of the
direct electrical link mode is misleading because the
mode had the capability of stabilizing the aircraft dur-
ing takeoff and landing--a capability that would not
exist in a direct, unaugrnented, stick-to-surface control
system. Analog reversion (AR) was a backup mode,
implemented in the analog computers, that was capa-
ble of recovering the aircraft from anywhere in the
flight envelope. Digital reversion (DR) was a digital
backup mode, which was removed during the flight test
program. A more complete description of the X-29A
control system modes can be found in Ref. 1.
Flight Control System Components
Flight control system hardware is illustrated in
Fig. 2. The canards, flaperons, and strake flaps were
utilized for pitch control. Flaperons were also used for
roll control, and the rudder was utilized for yaw con-
trol. Crossfeeds between lateral and directional axes
were included in the control laws that coordinated the
flapcronand ruddercommands.
The flightcontrolsystemwas a triplexdigitalsys-
tem witha triplexanalogbackup system. The goal
ofthesystem,withitsassociatedfailuredetection,re-
dundancy management, and faultreaction,was topro-
videsafereturnoftheaircraftaflcrany two subsystem
failures;thatis,failoperational/failsafe.The airdata
sensors, accelerometers, and primary rate gyros were
triplex for the digital control system. A backup set of
triplex rate gyros and a triplex set of impact pressure
sensors were provided for the backup analog control
system. The backup rate gyros were used by the dig-
ital system in the event of a primary rate gyro failure.
Pilot commands utilized triplex sensors of stick and
rudder pedal positions. Single-string inputs to the con-
trol system included the attitude heading reference sys-
tem (AHRS), throttle position (PLA), and the remotely
augmented vehicle (RAV) system.
Each digital and analog computer in the flight con-
trol system outputs all surface actuator commands.
Hardware logic monitored the flight control mode and
thereby selected raw commands from either the digital
computer or the analog computer. The raw commands
were interchanged between FCCs in analog form, and
hardware logic in each FCC outputs to the actuators the
midvalue of its commands and those of the other com-
puters. Each digital computer provided an ARINC 429
bus output, which contained information on both pro-
portional and discrete internal parameters, to the data
acquisition system for downlink telemetry. Only one
digital computer provided output to the engine, while
another provided output to cockpit displays.
Digital Flight Control Computer Architecture
Each of the three identical FCC boxes contained two
digital processors and a backup analog computer. Dig-
ital computers were a derivative of an HDP-5301 pro-
cessor that had been used on several other programs.
Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the digital com-
puter system. To achieve the required throughput, dig-
ital processing in each FCC was distributed between
an input/output processor (lOP) and a control law pro-
cessor (CLP). Interface functions, performed by the
lOP using fixed-point calculations, included discrete
and analog input and output; ARINC 429 bus input
from air data sensors; ARINC 429 bus output to down-
link telemetry system; redundancy management; fail-
ure detection; fault reaction; and initiated built-in test
(IBIT). The CLP executed the control laws, calcu-
lating actuator commands and some cockpit displays
from pilot and sensor inputs, using fixed-point and
floating-point calculations. Each processor contained
2 k of random access memory and 14 k of electrically
erasable, programmable, read-only memory. Synchro-
nization and data exchange occurred between the lOP
and CLP through 1 k of common memory.
The digital system operated at an 80 Hz minor cycle,
but the majority of the computations were run at40 Hz.
All FCCs ran the same software. The three FCCs were
synchronized to real time and to each other at the be-
ginning of each minor cycle. The executive functions
were task scheduling, synchronization and data ex-
change between FCCs, and synchronization and data
exchange within an FCC. The executive used a cyclic,
single-tasking structure which facilitated timing anal-
ysis because of its invariant execution order.
Each FCC had a serial data transfer capability with
the other two FCCs. The intercom data rate was
1.0 MHz, with sending and receiving under direct con-
trol of the lOP. Sensor and pilot command inputs were
exchanged for signal selection and monitoring, so that
all FCCs used the same inputs to the control laws. Ac-
tuator commands were exchanged to assure that the
outputs from the control laws were identical, having
used identical inputs. The integrity of each data ex-
change was tested to ensure that all FCCs performed
signal selections from identical data sets.
To implement the cross-channel FCC data exchange
and synchronization, the common memory had one
word of data and a one-word software flag for each
input and output that was processed. This technique
allowed the time lag between sensor input and control
surface output to be minimized and held constant.
The computers also executed many built-in tests that
were designed to ensure that the flight control com-
puter hardware and software were performing prop-
erly. These tests were performed when the system
was powered up and operating, in both the lOP and
the CLP. A set of pilot-initiated built-in tests checked
the flight control system sensors, displays, indicators,
and actuators.
Reference 2 contains a detailed description of the
digital FCC architecture.
Initial Flight Qualification
Organization and Responsibility
The X-29A program was sponsored by the U.S. De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
and managed by the U.S. Air Force Hight Dynam-
ics Laboratory. The aircraftwas built by theGrum-
man Aerospace Corp.,who had responsibilityfor
flightsafetyuntilthe aircraftwas deliveredto the
government. NASA's Ames-Dryden Hight Research
Facilityconductedindependentrcvicwsand analysis
of pre-dcliveryactivitiesand participatedin aircraft
ground tests.Grumman subcontractedtoHoneywell,
Inc.,forthe sensorcomputer subsystem,which in-
cludedtheFCC hardware and software.Tic prime
contractorwas responsiblefor providingthe cus-
tomer with a flight-qualifiedaircraft,includingFCC
flight software.
Software Development
It is not economically feasible to replace the advan-
tage of a well-managed, structured software develop-
mcnt approach with testing; it would require an infi-
nite amount of testing to gain confidence in software
produced using a poor development process. The sub-
contractor was responsible for the software develop-
ment process, with formal design reviews held by the
prime contractor and customer. The organizational
structure of the software development group consisted
of two major subgroups. One group was responsible
for the control law implementation, the other for the
input/output (I/O) implementation. Both groups had
lead engineers who reported to a software manager re-
sponsible for the technical and administrative aspects
of the software development process. It is custom-
ary in complex flight-critical applications to assign the
functions of design, code, and test to separate groups;
however, due to resource constraints, all of these func-
tions were performed by the same personnel.
A major factor in developing quality software is
the use of software standards and practices during
software design, code, and test. The software de-
velopment guidelines used were internal subcontrac-
tor guidelines based on DOD-STD-2167. Figure 4
presents an overview of the subcontractor's software
development process and illustrates how the develop-
ment process was partitioned into distinct phases. The
figure also shows the relationship between the hard-
ware and software dcvclopmcnt. The process is shown
to proceed sequenti',dly through the phases, but itera-
tions to the requirements, design, code, and test pro-
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cedures did take place. Once a baselined phase was
complete and a change had occurred, the requirements
and the software design were updated, and, if already
baselined, the code and test procedures were also up-
dated and reexecuted as part of the phase then currently
in progress. Reliable software was obtained by imple-
menting good engineering discipline in the software
development process.
A major challenge of any software-intensive devel-
opment effort is the apparently never-ending changes
to requirements. Fundamental to the design of a flight
control system for a technology demonstrator is the
ability to accommodate changes in the requirements
with minimum resources. The deficiency in most soft-
ware development life cycles is the assumption that
a perfect set of requirements exist before the design
phase begins. The subcontractor contended with this
deficiency in three major ways:
I.
,
.
Requirements the X-29A airplane had in com-
mon with other digital flight control system ar-
chitectures were applied to minimize the need
to reestablish those requirements and to take
advantage of off-the-shelf software and hard-
ware design.
Experienced systems and lead software engineers
reviewed customer and mission requirements and
determined what the customer "system objec-
tives" were and translated those objectives into
a formal design specification. The translation
process consisted of written text in block dia-
gram form and was based on their systems and
software experience and close interaction with
the customer. The block diagrams were espe-
cially useful in the test and maintenance phases of
the program.
The change control process was well structured
and key documents (related software develop-
ment plans, design specifications, and test plans)
were baselined to easily accommodate changes to
the customer requirements.
Each flight control computer had two Honeywell
HDP-5301 digital processors. The software was writ-
ten in HDP-5301 assembly language which consisted
of a 59-instruction-set architecture. It was a unique
instruction set and did not represent a microproces-
sor standard. Calculations were mixed between fixed-
and floating-point operations of single and double pre-
cision. The processor had a mode to prevent regis-
teroverflow. Theoperationalflightprogram(OFP)
ineachFCCconsistedof 205totalmodules(approx-
imately29,000instructions)utilizing approximately
2200variablesand3000constants.Executionof the
OFPineachprocessorwascontrolledbyasoftwarex-
ecutiveratestructureasopposedtoaninterrupt-driven
control.Thememoryorganizationof theOFPcon-
sistedof localizedvariablesandconstantsusedonly
intemalto amodule.It alsohadcommondatareposi-
toriesusedbytwoormoremodulesformajorfunctions
suchassignalselectionandredundancymanagement,
modelogicandfault reaction,andpilot IBITswhere
commonvariableswereheld.
Eachmodulecontaineda moduleheaderwhich
identifiedthemodulebynameandnumber,described
thefunctionof themodule,listedin tabularformby
datethemodulechangehistoryalongwith the au-
thor,andlistedtheinputsandoutputs.Thedesign
for eachsoftwaremodulewaswrittenin a loosely
structuredprogramdesignlanguage(PDL).Themod-
uledesignwasincludedwitheachmoduleaspanof
thecomments.
Oncethesoftwareengineerhadcleardesignspec-
ifications,thecodingprocessitself wasa relatively
straightforwardtask. To assistin keepingthecode
structuresusedby differentengineersconsistent,he
projectsoftwareteamestablishedcodingguidelines.
Theseguidelinesuggestedwaystoimplementvarious
codestructuresinanefficient manner. Assembly lan-
guage macros from other projects using the same pro-
gramming language were also used to aid in the cod-
ing process. Once the requirements were defined, the
module was designed and coded, and the module test
was written. A more detailed description of the tests
and test philosophy follows in the initial flight qualifi-
cation software assurance section of this paper.
All of the information applicable to each module
was kept in a unit development folder (UDF) in a cen-
tralized library. The UDF contained the module de-
sign, module code, module test procedure with results,
and applicable engineering information that might be
of interest to an engineer designing or coding an in-
terface with that particular module. The folder also
contained redlined masters of previous versions of the
module as it was changed in the development process.
This allowed a reviewer, for instance, to easily trace
how a change was incorporated.
Along with the formal design specification that was
used to code from, there was also a software descrip-
tion document that described various important aspects
of the software development process and key informa-
tion for the operational maintenance phases. This doc-
ument contained the memory map for each processor
(what was used and whal was spare), how to assem-
ble and link the code for each processor on the engi-
neering workstation, descriptions of major functions
implemented in the software, the design for each mod-
ule, data dictionaries, variable set/used tables, and a
graphical representation of the throughput and worst
case timing analysis for the operational flight program.
Tools
There were numerous software tools that were used
to minimize development time and the probability of
human error. The tools utilized are listed and described
in Table 2. Because of the size and complexity of the
operational flight program, the tools used to help the
developer organize information about the code were
the most advantageous. These included the set/used
tables, data dictionary tool, memory map tool, the Ben-
der chart tool, and the workstation tools.
The Bender chart tool was specially useful because
of the graphical manner in which it conveyed informa-
tion that was otherwise difficult to describe. An ex-
ample of a Bender chart is shown in Fig. 5. The Ben-
der chart tool shows the module execution frequency
(horizontal width) and the minor frames in which the
module was executed (at bottom of chart). It also
presents the worst case timing of each module (verti-
cal length) and shows resynchronization and processor
rendezvous points.
The timing tool was useful for two reasons. First,
an important aspect of any real-time application is
worst case module execution time. This is needed to
make sure available throughput is not exceeded. Sec-
ond, because of the synchronous nature of the system,
channel-dependent paths in the code needed to be bal-
anced. The timing tool assisted the engineer in deter-
mining the execution time of a given path using the
HDP-5301 source code as input.
The set/used tables allowed the developer to quickly
trace a variable's span of influence across the modules
in which it was used.
Another class of tools that proved to be extremely
helpful were tools that assisted the tester. These in-
cluded the data integrity tool, overflow analysis tool,
and function simulation (FSIM) tool.
The data integrity tool was a programming lan-
guage I (PL/I) program that used the HDP-5301 source
code as input. It verified that memory reference in-
structions dependent on processor mode (that is, fixed-
as opposed to floating-point mode) were used after
the processor had been set to the appropriate mode.
Gain scheduling using linear interpolation in fixed-
point mode made it necessary to use the overflow anal-
ysis tool to protect from inadvertent overflow. This
tool checked adjacent gain table breakpoints and veri-
fied that the gain scale factor was large enough to ac-
commodate differences.
The FSIM tool was an interactive program in which
the user would enter various types of control law ele-
ments (that is, lag filters, integrators, time delays) in a
given path and analytically compute the gain and phase
margins at discrete frequencies for that path. These
outputs would be used to compare with actual open
loop frequency response results.
An extensively used tool at the user facility for soft-
ware system testing was the extended aircraft interro-
gation and display system (XAIDS). It was a multi-
processor system which performed several functions:
terminal emulator to the system evaluation unit; patch
generation and transmission to flight conlxol comput-
ers; and display of ARINC 429 bus data from the flight
control computers on a terminal in engineering units,
as well as output of the information as analog signals.
The ARINC 429 display and conversion was particu-
larly useful, since it was the only way to display inter-
nal software parameters in real time.
The tools used on the X-29A program played an im-
portant part in developing quality software.
Software Assurance
Software assurance is a series of processes whose
goal is to deliver error-free, maintainable software. It
includes software design standards and practices (de-
scribed above), configuration management, reviews,
test philosophy, software verification and system vali-
dation, and media production and control (that is, ob-
ject tapes and source tapes).
Configuration Management (CM). This process
assures that the system configuration and problem sta-
tus are known, documented, and traceable. It is an
essential process throughout the life of a complex
system, especially one which is software intensive.
Configuration management consists of two major pro-
cesses: (1) change control, and (2) discrepancy re-
porting and correction. Change control is the process
by which design or implementation changes are de-
fined, implemented, tested, and incorporated in a new
baseline software release. Discrepancy reporting and
correction is the process by which design or imple-
mentation anomalies are reported, assigned criticality,
and closed out after correction (through the change
control process).
The CM process of each contractor interfaced with
the other such that software configuration and discrep-
ancies were known and traceable. The prime contrac-
tor used a software control board to authorize control
system design changes, trace software releases, and
track discrepancy reports. Its activities were limited
to the flight control system hardware and software.
The software developer used intemal documentation to
track discrepancies and perform change management.
The customer configuration control board operated in
parallel with the contractor software control board, in
an advisory capacity only.
Reviews. Reviews were held at all levels of devel-
opment. Figure 4 shows the developer review guide-
lines. Module design, code, tests, and test results were
subject to peer review. Integration tests and results
were also reviewed by lead engineers. The prime con-
tractor, whose personnel were resident at the software
developer's facility, conducted a formal review of the
module tests. The customer, whose personnel were
resident at the prime contractor's facility, reviewed
tests conducted by the prime contractor. Both the con-
tractor and the customer held flight readiness reviews.
Test Philosophy. Flight software undergoes two
types of testing activity during the process of flight
qualification: verification and validation. Verification
is the process by which determination is made that
the software performs as specified. It is accomplished
by devising individual tests for each specified soft-
ware task, conducting the test, and observing that the
task was accomplished according to the specification.
Validation is the broader task which seeks to deter-
mine if the system, of which the software is a part,
performs adequately to accomplish the flight require-
ments. Failure modes and effects tests (both open loop
and closed loop) are among the techniques used in soft-
ware validation. In these tests, failures are artificially
induced and a proper system response to those failures
is verified.
The critical nature of the software (capable of caus- •
ing loss of life or aircraft) dictated that a maximum
levelof testingwithin the resourcesof theproject
beaccomplished.Systemdesignreflectedthecrite-
rionthattheaircraftbeabletoreturnsafelyafterany
two failures(fail operational/failsafe). Verification
testsincludedsoftwaresystemintegrationaspectsas
well as individualsoftwaremoduletesting.Valida-
tiontestsconcentratedonthemostcriticalelementsof
thesoftware,thatis,controlawsduringnormalopera-
tion,faultreaction,modelogic,andsensorredundancy
management.Tominimizetheriskof undetectedsoft-
wareerrors,independentverificationandvalidation(V
andV) testswererun in additionto thecontractor's
V andV testing.Thephilosophywasto gainsystem
experiencein themostrealisticallysimulatedenviron-
mentpossibleto increaseconfidencethatthesystem
wouldperformasexpectedin therealworldenviron-
ment.Thepossibleknowncombinationsof realworld
stimuliaretoonumerousto analyzecompletely.The
morea systemis testedin a simulatedenvironment,
themoreunlikelyit becomesthatgenericfaultswill be
discovereduringflighttest.Theuseof experienced
softwareandsystemspersonnel in these areas of the
process was very cost effective.
Software Verification and Validation. Verifica-
tion and validation tests were performed by the con-
tractors in the initial flight qualification phase.
The subcontractor partitioned his verification testing
into three phases: (1) module testing, (2) intemal inde-
pendent review, and (3) systems testing. The rationale
for phase one module testing focused on two major
points. First, the module test was to verify that the code
reflected the intent of the module design. The module
test did not test the function of the module as part of
the system as a whole. Second, the module test exer-
cised all code paths at least once and, where applicable,
tested minimum and maximum input values. In the
case of complex modules, the module test contained a
description explaining the test cases. Phase two con-
sisted of a subcontractor's intemal independent gen-
eral review of the software structure, module inter-
faces, system requirements, and planned test coverage.
Phase three consisted of the systems-level tests with
the software and hardware integrated. System per-
formance was tested against the system requirements.
The majority of the system-level tests run on the con-
trol law processor consisted of open loop frequency
responses of the control law paths. Other tests run
were gain table X-Y plots, variable warmstart analysis
(occurred when a computer was reset), and an over-
flow analysis.
Most validation tests were performed using a six-
degree-of-freedom hardware-in-the-loop simulation at
the prime contractor facility. This simulation included
three FCCs using the flight software under test, a fail-
ure status control panel similar to that in the aircraft,
and in some cases electro-hydraulic actuators driv-
ing simulated control surfaces. Flying quality evalu-
ations of the unfailed system were conducted at speci-
fied points throughout the flight envelope in all of the
control modes. Failure modes and effects tests, which
tested flying qualities as well as system response and
annunciation during mode changes and simulated con-
trol system hardware failures, were conducted. Time
history and frequency responses were generated. Sim-
ulation results were compared with those predicted an-
alytically, and data on stability margins was obtained.
A five-degree-of-freedom simulation, with the actual
aircraft in the loop, was used for some validation tests.
For example, during limit cycle tests, the control sys-
tem gain margins were examined.
Independent Software Verification and Valida-
tion. The customers (NASA, Air Force, and Navy)
performed independent V and V test sequences
using NASA Ames-Dryden's six-degree-of-freedom
hardware-in-the-loop simulation, as shown in Fig. 6.
This simulation included three FCCs, a failure sta-
tus control panel, and an analog computer model of
surface actuators. Some contractor tests were re-
peated, and customer-generated validation tests were
run. These tests were of the same types as those run
at the contractor facility, but they used different hard-
ware, simulation system, and test procedures. Testing
from a second perspective, using a different test facil-
ity, minimizes the risk of undetected errors. This risk
reduction is the value of independent V and V. For ex-
ample, it was discovered during these tests that certain
dual-rate gyroscope failures to null caused loss of air-
craft if the first failure was undetected.
Operational Maintenance
Changes in Organization and Responsibility
Official delivery of the aircraft, with a limited flight
envelope, occurred after flight number four. The cus-
tomer then assumed responsibility for the aircraft, and
for flight safety. The contractors continued participa-
tion in design changes, and were responsible for design
and V and V of the full envelope control system. Ex-
cept for the first major modification done to the control
laws (full envelope release), validation testing was the
responsibilityof the customer and verification testing
was shared by contractor and customer.
Software Development
When changes to the design specification were re-
ceived by the developer, he chose a method of imple-
mentation based on the complexity and form of the
change being requested. This decision affected the
testing process both at the developer and customer fa-
cilities. The four methods of implementation that were
used will be discussed in order of increasing complex-
ity. The testing path for each of the implementation
methods is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Overlay. Only simple changes of values of con-
stants were incorporated by overlay. In this method no
source code was changed. The FCC program was not
reassembled. Flight control computer program mem-
ory was loaded with the baseline release. The FCC
memory was then altered to incorporate the changes,
and the contents of its program memory (not just the
changes) were re-recorded to a new tape containing
the new software release. This type of implementation
required the least amount of retest. Overlay changes
were retested on each subsequent release until a release
was implemented by relink and tested.
Permanent Relink-Without-Relocation. Only
simple constant changes were incorporated by perma-
nent relink-without-relocation. In this method source
code was changed, but the change did not result in
any code relocation. Thus, no instruction addresses
changed from the previous release. Affected modules
were reassembled and all modules were relinked. This
method required the same amount of testing as an over-
lay change. No retest of the change was required on
subsequent releases as the change was permanent.
Relink-Without-Relocation. Simple structural
code changes were generally implemented by using
this method. Source code was changed in such a way
that code downstream of the change was not relocated.
The changed modules were reassembled and all mod-
ules were relinked. Added code was put in a desig-
nated unused area and called from the modified mod-
ule by way of branches inserted in-line so as not to re-
locate any other code. This method was used when it
was desired to minimize the level of testing. It is sec-
ond to relink-with-relocation in terms of the amount of
testing required. Changes implemented by this method
were retested when the code located in the patch area
was put in-line by way of relink-with-relocation.
Relink-With-Relocation. In this method, source
code was changed and all modifications were made in-
line. The affected modules were reassembled, and all
modules were relinked. The term "with relocation" in-
dicated that in the process of adding or deleting code,
other code was relocated. As a result, the addresses
downstream of the change were no longer the same as
in the previous release. This method was used for ma-
jor structural changes and when a new, unadulterated
baseline was desired. As in all changes made by relink,
object code was downloaded to the program memory
in the FCC and the program memory contents were
then recorded onto a cassette tape. Of the four meth-
ods used to implement a change, this method required
full regression testing.
Tools. Various tools which have become avail-
able since the initial software development, along with
those discussed in the initial development section of
this paper, were used during software development
and test at the developer's and the customer's facili-
ties. These are listed in Table 2 as used in the mainte-
nance phase.
The configuration control tool was a developer soft-
ware library manager which tracked module source
code revisions and prevented any module from being
modified by two programmers at the same time.
The spare memory tool was used by the developer to
document unused program memory. This information
provided statistical data on percent memory usage, as
well as specific information on memory available in
patch areas for use in a relink-without-relocation.
Checksum tools were used by the developer and the
customer to partially verify that the download of ob-
ject code to flight computer memory from the assem-
bler/linker was successful. Checksums were calcu-
lated from the output of the linker for comparison to
those calculated by the system evaluation unit (SEU)
from flight computer memory.
The SEU interface utility is a personal computer
program, developed by the customer but also used
by the flight software developer, in which the per-
sonal computer is a front end to the system evaluation
unit. Normal and enhanced terminal functions are per-
formed; however, additional menu-driven capability
includes saving the terminal keystrokes and responses
on a disk file, creating flight computer patches, saving
them to disk file, and sending them to the flight com-
puters (in any combination of channels), starling and
stopping the processors, and computing checksums.
Newtoolsto enablethecustomerto do thesource
comparisonsrequiredin releases produced by relink-
with-relocation include tape reading tools, which un-
pack and sort developer source code tapes so the infor-
mation can be saved on disk, and a source file compar-
ison tool, which does the source comparison between
two disk files and then prints the differences.
The overplot tool allows the customer to plot test
data over reference data on a hard copy. Time histories
and frequency response gain and phase are routinely
overplotted as part of software system validation.
The XAIDS was equipped to retransmit ARINC 429
bus data from the three FCCs to the simulation com-
puter on a single 1553 bus.
Software Configuration Management
Configuration management responsibility was as-
sumed by the customer upon aircraft delivery. Prime
contractor internal configuration management re-
mained active, but with decreasing project responsi-
bility. Subcontractor configuration management re-
mained essentially unchanged.
Configuration Control Board. The configura-
tion control board met at the customer facility and
was chaired by the customer project manager or a de-
signee. The board was composed of technical experts
from all program disciplines involved in flight safety
and research. Membership included representatives
of all governmental and contractual organizations in-
volved with the aircraft. Disciplines included flight
operations, flight controls, simulation, acrostructures,
loads, aerodynamics, instrumentation (including on-
board systems, real-time data display, and data reduc-
tion), and flight planning.
The board performed the same functions as the
contractor software control board. These functions
included change control, discrepancy reporting and
corrective action, and risk assesment. However,
in addition to those functions, the board also con-
trolled the entire aircraft, control room, data reduction,
and simulation.
Change Control Process. The X-29A process is
illustrated in Fig. 8. Changes were generated due to
discovered problems (in which case a discrepancy re-
port was written) or because of the addition of new
mission requirements. Configuration change requests
(CCRs) could be written by anyone and were sub-
miued to board membership in advance of the reg-
ularly scheduled meeting. All items handled by the
board were identified and entered into a database sys-
tem to facilitate traceability. The board had several
options on the disposition of new change requests:
(1) hold, (2) retum for analysis, (3) disapprove, or
(4) approve. It could also cancel previously submitted
requests. Items "held" could be resubmitted at a later
date. Items retumed for analysis required clarification
to convince the board that the proposed change was
safe or even necessary. Disapproved changes required
no further board action. The board made technical rec-
ommendations to project management on the disposi-
tion of CCRs. However, management could overrule
decisions they considered beyond the means of project
resources. Anyone on the board could recommend that
a change not be incorporated.
Once CCRs were written, software program change
notices (PCNs) were generated from the CCRs by
on-site contractors who had the most detailed knowl-
edge of the control system architecture and specifica-
tion documents. Program change notices were soft-
ware design documents which had two functions in the
X-29A program: (1) to provide detailed software de-
sign specification changes, and (2) to authorize imple-
mentation of those changes. These documents were
presented to the configuration control board in two dif-
ferent ways: (1) for information only (no approval re-
quired) if the design changes mirrored the CCR from
which it was derived; or (2) for official approval, if the
design differed from the initiating change request. Pro-
gram change notices were identified by the customer
using a hybrid numbering system which consisted of
a customer version number with a contractor version
number appended (that is, PCN 012-2015).
A PCN was delivered to the prime contractor who,
in turn, delivered it to the software developer. The soft-
ware developer then incorporated the change using the
production method agreed on by the customer and on-
site contractor personnel. An engineering change no-
tice containing information on the design, implementa-
tion, testing accomplished, cross-reference to the PCN
for traceability, and developer's identification of the
new software release was generated. The engineering
change notices were then delivered with the final ver-
sion of the software release.
lfa new release was to be generated by overlay only,
the customer had the option to create the new object
tape in-house and begin V and V testing. This tape
would later be compared bit for bit to the final re-
lease tape sent to the customer after the developer had
completed required verification testing. If the tapes
did not compare bit for bit, all testing done on the
customer-created tape would be invalidated and the
process would begin again with the developer's final
tape. When the new release was gcnerated by a method
other than overlay, the customer would receive a pre-
liminary object tape when the developer had sufficient
confidence in the implementation of the new release.
A new software release was delivered to the cus-
tomer by way of the prime contractor. The cus-
tomer then renamed the release to correspond with the
scheme inherited from the prime contractor. On re-
ceipt of the preliminary tape, the customer would start
the V and V process, as shown in Fig. 7. Meanwhile,
the devcloper completed the verification tcsts at his fa-
cility and either delivered a final tape or authorized the
customer to relabel the preliminary tape as a final tape.
Customer V and V would continue until all required
tests were complete. System test reports (customer test
results which had bccn reviewed by a cognizant engi-
neer) were thcn presented to the configuration control
board for test acceptance and configuration change re-
quest closeout. It was the duty of the customer soft-
ware manager to ensure that all configuration changc
requests implemented in a new rclcase had been closed
before the release was flown.
Discrepancy Reporting and Corrective Action.
Discrepancy reports were generated when an occur-
rence was not expected or was considered unsafe by
cognizant personnel. Discrepancies could be unex-
pected test results or a problem uncovered during nor-
mal flight operation. They were submitted to and pro-
cessed by the configuration control board in the same
fashion as configuration change requests. Discrep-
ancy reports were presented to the configuration con-
trol board when: (1) the discrepancy report was ini-
tially submitted for acceptance (agreement that it was
in fact a discrepancy) and assignment of criticality;
and (2) for closeout, after corrective action and test-
ing had occurred, or when another justification existed
for closeout.
Criticality was assigned to each discrepancy report
based on the possible effect the discrepancy had on
flight safety and research mission accomplishment:
Criticality of 1, flight critical, indicates possible loss
of life or the aircraft; criticality of 2, mission critical,
indicates that a research objective could be lost; and
criticality of 3 was assigned to those which fit neither
criticality of 1 nor criticality of 2. Discrepancies with
criticality of 1 had to be closed or (if the discrepancy
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was sufficiently improbable, difficult to fix, and able
to be monitored) put on a project accepted risk list be-
fore the aircraft was flown. The accepted risk list was
reviewed at a briefing prior to each flight. Lesser crit-
icality software discrepancies did not prevent the air-
craft from flying and were fixed at a convenient time.
Mission critical discrepancies would keep the aircraft
from flying if pilot procedures could not compensate
for the problem.
Closeout of discrepancy reports was based on
changes which had gone through the change control
process and had been verified to correct the discrep-
ancy. Discrepancy reports were also closed out be-
cause they were no longer applicable. For instance,
reports of discrepancies occurring in a certain flight
control mode were closed out when that mode was re-
moved from the control system. If a discrepancy could
not be corrected for any reason, that discrepancy report
remained open.
There was a separate, but sometimes overlapping,
discrepancy mechanism utilizing the aircraft logbook,
which was used for routine maintenance and hardware
replacement.
Software Assurance
Reviews. Software developer intemal reviews
continued as before in the operational phase. Prime
contractor reviews of developer verification tests were
ended. Flight readiness reviews of new software were
generally included as part of the technical briefing held
before the first flight with a new release. The technical
briefing also included a description of changes and a
summary of any open discrepancies.
Test Philosophy. The scope of the software devel-
oper verification tests was based on the method of pro-
duction by which the modules were changed. As in the
initial flight qualification of any new software release,
the more system tests that were performed, the more
the confidence in the system grew.
The customer always conducted a functional veri-
fication test on each change to close the CCR from
which it was authorized. It was never assumed that
the contents of a delivered object tape to be used for
flight was correct. The tape contents were loaded
into FCC memory. Memory was then verified to have
the expected numbers (per documentation supplied) in
the checksum locations, and the rest of memory was
checksummed with the results compared to the ex-
pected checksums. This process verified that the object
tapemediahadnotbeenalteredduringtransitfromthe
developer. After a bit-for-bit comparison to the previ-
ous software release, a second flight object tape was
created from memory loaded with the delivered copy.
This comparison verified (for most methods of soft-
ware production) that the correct changes, and only
the expected changes, were incorporated in the new re-
lease. The magnitude of validation testing, and the de-
cision whether to perform independent V and V, were
based on: (1) safety of flight implications of a design,
specification, or implementation error in the changes;
(2) the number and complexity of changes; and (3) the
method of production.
Software Verification and Validation. The scope
of the developer's verification testing ranged from
module tests only for nonflight critical software
changes, to module and full integration tests for flight
critical changes.
Customer testing is illustrated in Fig. 7, Soft-
ware/system verification and validation process. The
first three steps shown in the figure were always done,
followed sequentially by V and V tests based on
method of production, optional validation steps based
on safety implications and complexity of changes, a
mandatory five hours of simulation by a project pilot
using the new release, and ending with a document re-
leasing the new software for flight. A brief explanation
of the tests noted in Fig. 7 follows.
New Tape Verification Process was an object tape
media test which assured the customer that the tape
contents were the same as noted by the developer dur-
ing tape recording. It also verified that the proper
changes were implemented (except for tapes produced
by relink-with-relocation). It included copying the
original tape to have a second flightwonhy tape for
backup, pending successful completion of V and V
testing. A nonflight simulation tape was recorded, in
which a patch was included. This patch disabled in-
structions to write to FCC nonvolatile memory, which
had hardware constraints on the number of writes be-
fore mandatory replacement. This was considered im-
portant since simulation computers could, after accep-
tance testing, be used on the flight vehicle. The sec-
ond purpose of the patch was to disable monitoring of
a nonvital-simutated sensor, the attitude heading refer-
ence system, when the simulation was not in operation.
Without the patch, this simulated sensor was usually
declared failed when the simulation was reset, caus-
ing operational problems and altering failure mode
test results.
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Standardized Test Matrix verified in a gross man-
ner that the new software communicated with the FCC
hardware over a large subset of flight computer in-
puts and outputs. Regardless of the method of produc-
tion, each change was functionally tested to close its
CCR, using the CCR and the PCN to define the test re-
quirements. In all production methods, previous over-
lays were retested. Relink-with-relocation required
retest of software coded in-line for the first time, and
two steps to verify that the correct software changes
were incorporated. The first step was to produce the
new release at the customer's facility from a source
tape received from the developer. The object code
was bit-for-bit compared with the object tape received
from the developer, which verified the integrity of the
source tape. Source code from the verified tape was
then compared with the source code of the last release.
The differences verified that the proper changes were
incorporated.
The change documentation lifecycle is complete;
however validation testing of the release containing
the change must be accomplished successfully before
it can be used on the aircraft. Validation tests depen-
dent on method of production included time histories
and frequency responses, where relink-with-relocation
required the full set. In practice, the full set of time
histories and frequency responses was run on all new
releases where time histories are required, since those
tests have been partially automated.
Additional time histories and frequency responses
have been required on releases with specific control
law changes. The use of failure modes and effects
tests, and the scope of the tests, depended on safety
implications and complexity of the changes.
When all V and V was successfully completed, a
software release document was prepared which autho-
rized the new software release for flight. It described
all changes incorporated in the new release, listed rel-
evant CCRs, PCNs and system test reports (STRs),
and briefly described tests accomplished by the devel-
oper and by the customer. All discrepancy reports gen-
erated during testing were listed with their criticality
and their status (open or closed). The software release
document was published as an X-29A internal docu-
ment and distributed to project personnel. For each
flight day, which may consist of several flights, a flight
tape release form was signed by the customer software
manager, the aircraft operations engineer, and an in-
spector. It contained flight numbers for which it was
valid, the release identification of the software to be
used,thechecksums, as well as statements that all re-
quired testing had been accomplished, that the tape
was suitable for flight, and that the tape was loaded
properly on the aircraft FCCs.
Independent Software Verification and System
Validation. Three major control system changes
since aircraft delivery resulted in independent V and
V efforts. Those tests were devised and run by gov-
ernment personnel (when the V and V was done by the
prime contractor for expanded envelope), by the prime
contractor, and by non-NASA govemment personnel.
Parallel Activities
The change process was shortened by subcontractor
and customer working in parallel. The greatest time
saving was in software test. The software developer
sent a preliminary object tape to the customer after par-
tial testing, allowing customer V and V tests to be run
in parallel with the remaining developer verification.
When a problem requiring a second preliminary re-
lease occurred, full retest was generally not required
at either the developer or customer facility; the prac-
tice of sending preliminary tapes saved time even if
changes had to be made. At times, V and V could also
be accomplished in parallel with an independent V and
V effort.
The customer could produce a new object tape by
overlay in parallel with the developer generating the
same release by overlay or permanent relink-without-
relocation. Integrity of the customer-generated tape
was ensured by a bit-for-bit comparison with the tape
received from the developer. Customer V and V could
begin as soon as the procedure for overlay tape gener-
ation was complete. Changes of this type which also
required minimum validation testing have been im-
plemented, tested, and released for flight in less than
one week.
Dryden Simulation Facility
Facility Description
One of the best investments that the X-29A program
made was in the simulation capability at NASA Ames-
Dryden Flight Research Facility, where the flight test
program was conducted. The major cost impact was
the hardware-in-the-loop simulation in which certain
flying qualities can be evaluated, and where a large
subset of the possible subsystem failures could be sim-
ulated using actual flight hardware and software. This
capability enabled the customer to perform large-scale
independent V and V testing prior to first flight and
12
prior to expanded envelope flight, and to perform the
V and V testing of changes made during the flight
test program.
This simulation was also used to test preliminary
software designs, and for pilot training. It included
the simulation computer (equipped with a large num-
ber of discrete and analog inputs and outputs), three
FCCs, a failure status control panel (an X-29A cockpit
panel), an interface console (signal conditioning, and
test points tied to all pins of the FCC signal connec-
tors for all three channels), an analog actuator model
(analog simulation of the surface actuators, including
failure detection and operational modes), a SIBLINC
(signal conditioning for simulated sensors), and the
XAIDS (a microcomputer device which emulated a
terminal into flight computer test hardware, and which
displayed in engineering units the digital data out-
putted from the three flight computers for downlink).
All-FORTRAN real-time and batch simulations
were used for control system checkout and to produce
reference data against which flight software was val-
idated. The real-time simulation required simulation
cockpit hardware and limited simulation computer in-
put and output interfaces; and the batch simulation
required no external hardware. They were indepen-
dent implementations of the same specifications from
which the FCCs were coded.
Automated Testing
An initial capability of automated testing was res-
ident in the simulation facility. It is envisioned that
this capability will be greatly expanded when Dryden's
Integrated Test Facility, now under construction, be-
comes operational.
The test capability included many useful features.
Commands to the simulation program could be in-
putted from a test script and saved as a text file on disk
rather than from a terminal. Each analog and discrete
input and output of the simulation could assume three
independent values, changing value at times read from
an internal clock whose resolution was 12.5/zs. A sine
wave sweep generator, whose beginning and ending
frequencies and amplitudes were controllable, could
be summed with any of the analog inputs or outputs.
Using these capabilities, simulated switches could be
operated, simulated sensors could be failed, and fre-
quency response data could be obtained.
The X-29A program incorporated automated test
features as they became available, and when hardware
constraints allowed. Interface modifications to the
hardware-in-the-loopsimulationwereincorporatedto
maximizethe abilityof the simulationcomputerto
controlanaloganddiscreteinputstotheflightcontrol
systemhardwareusedin thesimulation.TheStandard-
izedTestMatrix (thetestof flight controlcomputer
inputsandoutputs)andtimehistoriesandfrequency
responses,whoseoverplotsto referencecaseswere
usedto determinecorrectnessof controlsystemop-
eration,werepartiallyautomated.Failuremodesand
effectstests,in whichsimulatedsubsystemfailures
wereintroduceduringreal-timeoperationat known
flightconditions,havenotyetbeenautomated;how-
ever,with theproposedincorporationof anouterloop
autopilot,automationwouldbecomepractical.
Reductionof testdatawasdoneonacomputerother
thantheoneusedforreal-timesimulation.Datatrans-
ferbetweenthesimulationcomputerandtheoneused
for datareductionis a technicalproblemcurrentlyin
work.Ideally,onecomputerwouldcontrolthetestex-
ecution,datatransfer,anddatareductionin anauto-
matedsequence.Thishasbeenaccomplishedin alim-
itedfashion,butthecapabilityisnotyetoperational.
Theverificationof properchangesin releasespro-
ducedby relink-with-relocationinvolvedassembly
andrelinkofsourcecode,andsourcecomparisonwith
apreviousrelease.Theseoperationsusedthesoftware
productionandsourcecomparecapabilitiesresidentin
thesimulationfacility.
A personalcomputerwasusedtospeedtheprocess
of FCChardwareacceptancet sting,by calculating
pass/failstatus,andrecordingdataondisk.It wasalso
programmedasa terminalemulatorandfrontendto
theFCCinterfacehardware,theSEU.In additionto
thenormalfunctionsof adumbterminal,arecordof
terminalinputsandoutputscouldbesavedondisk,and
softwarepatchescouldbewritten,savedondisk,and
senttotheflightcomputers.
Observations and Recommendations
The X-29A program was strictly a research cffort;
therefore, some of the problem areas were unique to
that environment. Most were typical of problems
which may be encountered in any critical software de-
velopment and maintenance effort.
The organization having responsibility for hands-on
operation and maintenance of a complex software sys-
tem (that is, a user organization) should, from program
inception, recognize several management and techni-
cal issues. Most of these issues were recognized by the
X-29A program. Issues will be stated in the context of
a generic program which has a software developer or-
ganization and a user organization.
All parties should agree to documentation and con-
figuration management standards at the beginning so
configuration control can be passed from the devel-
oper to the user on delivery. The X-29A situation of
two numbering systems for PCNs, and for software re-
leases, illustrates this problem.
In order to facilitate design and test activities, ini-
tial system requirements should include system test in-
terfaces which provide access to hardware and soft-
ware internal parameters. These parameters should
be randomly accessible without interrupting real-time
operation, and be displayed as either raw data or en-
gineering units. The capability to stop the proces-
sor at will should be implemented, with multiple safe-
guards against inadvertent halts during normal opera-
tion. The test interfaces should have the capability of
test automation.
Initial Flight Qualification Phase
It was reaffirmed during operational maintenance
that some of the most helpful coding guidelines are as
follows. Straightforward coding is more cost-effective
than coding that is difficult to understand and to mod-
ify. This is true even if the unorthodox code uses hard-
ware or software features that make it more efficient.
Documentation which adds to the readability of the
code (PDL) and meaningful comments is highly de-
sirable. Variable names should be chosen with care
and should reflect the variable's function.
Configuration management activity (change control
and discrepancy reporting) at the developer facilities
should be closely monitored by the user. Developer
and user documentation should be compatible to allow
smooth transition of responsibility from the developer
to the user at delivery.
Technical personnel from the user organization
should actively participate in developer system inte-
gration, and in V and V test activities. This was done
with the X-29A program, and the knowledge gained
was invaluable. User and developer should realize
up front that integration and testing, with the design
changes they will most certainly produce, consume
more resources (time and money) than is usually al-
lotted for them.
If the system is of a critical nature, an independent
V and V should be considered. This concept was used
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successfully in the X-29A program. It provides gready
increased confidence in the software system. Total in-
dependence infers a different organization generating
and executing the tests using a different facility with a
different implementation of the same simulated exter-
nal environment. In practice, an independent V and V
can be useful with some aspects of commonality with
the V and V activities.
Operational Maintenance Phase
The following recommendations refer to the
user's facility.
Skilled and knowledgeable technical people, includ-
ing both user and developer personnel, should be as-
signed to the operational site and work together as a
project team with a minimum of organizational bar-
riers. Every effort should be made to have systems
and software people who worked on the develop-
ment continue at the customer site, and if applica-
ble at the developer facility, during the operational
maintenance period. Contractor personnel assigned to
Dryden were valuable and respected members of the
X-29A project team.
Rigorous configuration management is required, in-
cluding a configuration control board on which project
management and representatives from all disciplines
and organizations of the technical team participate.
Successful implementation of the configuration man-
agement process relies on a dedicated and knowledge-
able configuration control board, working with project
management who realize the importance of the pro-
cess. An undocumented, but extremely important,
function of the configuration control board is dissemi-
nation of information to the many disciplines involved
in operation of the aircraft; not only the effects of
changes, but knowledge of the deficiencies of air-
borne and ground support systems. All members of
the project team should understand and be involved
with the discrepancy reporting, investigation, and cor-
rective action process. Care must be exercised in use
of parallel discrepancy reporting and correction sys-
tems, such as the aircraft workbook on the X-29A
project. A "routine" maintenance item, such as a throt-
tle lever adjustment, may impact operation of a con-
trol mode, such as precision approach control (PAC).
As part of the change control process, the user orga-
nization should have and exert full authority to direct
the software implementation process to ensure com-
pliance with the decisions of the configuration control
board. This implies direct control over the developer
organization. The user on the X-29A program had
no direct contractual ties to the developer, only with
the prime contractor. At times, the configuration man-
agement process was compromised by the prime con-
tractor modifying or delaying implementation of ap-
proved changes.
Facilities for software system V and V should be
provided at the user site, utilizing as a minimum the ac-
tual computer hardware and software. The test facility
should provide individual control of system inputs, and
capability of monitoring and recording in engineering
units system inputs and outputs. It should be designed
with the maximum automation allowed by the system
under test. In the case of a flight control system, this
requirement is met by a hardware-in-the-loop closed-
loop simulation in which all flight computer inputs are
individually controlled and outputs go to actual or sim-
ulated flight hardware. Simulation constraints should
not force modifications of flight code to enable testing.
From a technical viewpoint, the long-term gains from
such a facility far exceed the cost of its implementa-
tion and maintenance. Most of these criteria were met
by Dryden's X-29A hardware-in-the-loop simulation.
Expanded capability will be available when Dryden's
Integrated Test Facility becomes operational. System
test capability will range from hardware-in-the-loop
simulation (with additional automated test capability)
to aircraft-in-the-loop (iron bird) simulation. The six-
degree-of-freedom iron bird simulation will monitor
actual control surface positions and simulated engine
thrust to provide to the aircraft systems simulated sen-
sor information, which in some tests is summed with
the outputs of aircraft sensors. Flying qualities, with
and without failures inserted, can be evaluated with
the maximum amount of flight hardware and soft-
ware active.
The user should obtain the capability to develop
software in-house. If practical, software development
should transition to the user's facility at delivery, with
on-site developer and user personnel sharing the re-
sponsibility for development. If software development
is done off-site, source code should be transmitted to
the user on a medium which can be utilized by both
the developer and the user. The software development
capability is then required as pan of the verification
that the proper software changes were incorporated in
a new software release.
If unnecessary features exist in critical software, it
may be cost-effective to eliminate those features. A
flight control mode, DR, was removed from the X-29A
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controlsystem.Thebenefitsof theDR modewere
overshadowedby thecostin V andV testresources
requiredtoretestit ateachnewsoftwarerelease.
Late in the flight program on the first X-29A, it
was discovered during validation testing that at certain
flight conditions a within-tolerance air data failure (at
those conditions a failure to null) caused the aircraft to
become unstable. This pointed out a deficiency in the
test philosophy up to that time. Previously, the sim-
ulated aircraft flying qualities had been tested under
nominal conditions, and with single and multiple sub-
system failures to null or hardover. It became obvious
that a series of tests with subsystem outputs in error
by just under the failure tolerance should be required.
This type of testing has since been implemented on the
X-29A aircraft, and is recommended for other applica-
ble systems.
Concluding Remarks
The X-29A program illustrates that a complex,
software-intensive, software-critical system can be
successfully developed, flight qualified, and main-
tained under less than ideal programmatic conditions.
Multiple organizations with diverse backgrounds were
intimately involved in the development and change
processes. The limited manpower in the software area
during development was further reduced during oper-
ational maintenance.
All participants in software system development and
maintenance recognized the importance of the fol-
lowing software assurance processes: software de-
sign standards, reviews, change control, discrepancy
reporting and correction, and verification and valida-
tion testing. The software system test facility at the
user facility was utilized in the development of design
specifications as well as for verification and valida-
tion testing.
Tools used by and developed for the X-29A pro-
gram reduced the probability of error and increased
the productivity of software development and test per-
sonnel. The autotest capability proved to be very use-
ful in shortening the time required to complete numer-
ous tests which were always repeated following a con-
trol system change. The lack of a centralized project
database to store the vast amounts of information as-
sociated with complex software-critical systems hin-
dered both the development and maintenance phases.
The success of the X-29A software system is the
result of several factors: Overall good cooperation
of the prime contractor and the software developer
with NASA Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility,
the user organization; the technical expertise of the
control law designers and the software developer; the
technical excellence and teamwork exhibited by the
various contractor and customer software and systems
personnel assigned to Dryden; the high-quality soft-
ware validation test facilities at the prime contractor
facility and at Dryden; project management support
of the configuration management process; and project
management support of the software test team.
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Table1.The X-29A flight control modes.
Control
modes Option Function Description
Normal Normal Variable gains based on airspeed, altitude,
flight Mach number, angle of attack. Digital
implementation. Pilot selectable.
ACC
MCC
Speed
stability
Degraded
modes
Automatic camber control (ACE') continu-
ously trimmed flaps to maintain optimum
performance. Pilot selectable.
Manual camber control (MCC) positioned
the flaps at discrete positions and held
them fixed as long as the canard was
operating within its acceptable range. Pi-
lot selectable.
A pilot aid to maintain constant airspeed.
Automatic below a defined airspeed, pilot
selectable above.
Adaptations of the normal mode control sys-
tem to loss of certain sensors. Automatic.
Normal PA Takeoff and Power approach (PA) gains. Automatic when
landing pilot selects landing configuration.
Precision approach Precision Autothrottle mode which controlled airspeed,
control landing allowing the pilot to control flight path
angle with the pitch stick. Pilot selectable
in normal.
Digital reversion
UA
PA
Normal flight A backup mode using reduced sensor comple-
ment. Pilot selectable and automatic down-
mode from normal with certain failures.
Up-and-away (UA) gains. Pilot selectable.
PA gains. Pilot selectable.
Direct electrical link Ground Control system mode automatically selected
operation when weight was on any wheel.
Analog reversion Analog backup Backup control system implemented in
analog hardware (the only mode not imple-
mented using software). Pilot selectable or
automatic downmode from digital modes
with certain failures.
UA UA control system with gains scheduled on
impact pressure. Pilot selectable.
PA PA control system with fixed gains. Pilot
selectable.
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Table2. Tools used during software development.
Tool Phase used in Description
5301 assembler
5301 link editor
Downline load tool
Workstation tools
Data dictionary tools
Data integrity tool
Overflow analysis tool
Set/use table
Bender chart
Memory map tool
Timing tool
Spare memory tool
Checksum program
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Maintenance
Maintenance
Assembles 5301 source code.
Links 5301 object code to create flight
code.
Transfers flight code from/_VAX to flight
computer.
DEC Control Language (DCL) programs
to facilitate human interface with 5301
assembler and link editor on the
/zVAX II workstation.
These tools helped create and maintain
a listing of all the control law proces-
sor variables. Units, scale factors, data
types, and description.
This tool traced program execution in
the source code and verified proces-
sor mode (floating point, single pre-
cision, double precision, etc .... ) be-
fore execution of a memory reference
instruction.
Tool to look at adjacent entries in gain
tables to verify that the difference
between them would not cause an over-
flow in the processor.
Listing of which module sets and/or uses
a variable.
Graphical display of processor through-
put and worst case module execution
time in #s.
Generates listing of all variables and their
addresses.
Computes path execution time using
source code.
Looks at assembled version of code and
determines locations of spare memory.
Computes checksums of linked flight
code to compare to the checksums gen-
erated by the SEU. The SEU is the in-
terface to the flight control computers.
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Table 2. Concluded.
Tool Phase used in Description
Configuration control tool Maintenance An online configuration management tool
to safeguard flight code from acciden-
tal updates, etc .... Acts as a "librar-
ian" to the flight code modules.
Function simulation (FSIM)
SEU interface utility
Overplot tool
Autotest capability
Development
and maintenance
Maintenance
Maintenance
Maintenance
XAIDS Maintenance
Source comparison tool
ASCII file tools
Tape reading tools
Maintenance
Development
and maintenance
Maintenance
Generates phase and gain values at dis-
crete frequencies given elements in a
software path.
Macintosh program for a front end to the
SEU.
Generates control files for the plotting
program to overplot 5301 and FOR-
TRAN time history runs.
Automatically collects time history
and frequency response data for
plotting. Automatically generates
sensor failures to check redundancy
management.
Extended aircraft interrogation and dis-
play system. User interface to the
SEU. Also converts ARINC 429 bus
data to 1553 data for use by simulation
computer.
Compares two large source files and
prints differences.
Tool to take out tabs, put in tabs, various
other ASCII file manipulations to facil-
itate printing, archiving (on tape), and
editing of large files.
Unpacks and sorts Honeywell source
code tapes.
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